PRODUCTS LIABILITY-PREEMPTION

AND RETROACTIVITY-

FEDERAL CIGARETrE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT DOES
NOT PREEMPT STATE TORT LAW CLAIMS AND NEW JERSEY
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY-

Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239
(1990).
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer,
Heart Disease, Emphysema And May Complicate Pregnancy'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The health risks associated with the use of tobacco products
have been suspected for nearly four hundred years.2 An accurate
scientific understanding of the effects of tobacco smoke, however, has only been attained since the beginning of the twentieth
century. 3 To date, forty-three carcinogenic chemicals have been
identified in cigarette smoke.' In the United States today, the
effects of cigarette smoking alone have been shown to result in
more than fifteen percent of all deaths.5 Moreover, approxi1 One of a sequence of four warning labels required by the Cigarette Labeling

and Advertising Act [hereinafter Cigarette Act] to be placed in a quarterly rotation
upon cigarette products manufactured for consumption in the United States. 15
U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). The three other warnings provide:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks To Your Health;
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight;
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1988).
2 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Resources, Reducing the Health Consequences of
Smoking.- 25 Years of Progress - A Report of the Surgeon General 5 (1989) [hereinafter
Reducing the Health Consequences]. Commentators acknowledge a long history of consumer apprehension concerning the dangers involved in smoking. See, e.g., Crist &
Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation-IsAnything Really So New?,
54 TENN. L. REV. 551, 553 (1987). This fear has been expressed in various media
dating back to the seventeenth century. Id. at 553-56. Concern for the health
hazards of cigarette smoke increased sharply in the twentieth century due to the
work of organizations such as the Anti-Cigarette League, the Boys International
Anti-Cigarette League, the Non-Smokers Protective League of America, and the
Women's Christian Temperance Union. Id. at 555 n.24. Each group published and
distributed information in an attempt to end smoking. Id. The scope of the interest in protecting society from the dangers of smoking was reflected in the political
spectrum as well. Id. at 555. A 1920 Republican presidential candidate advocated
the national prohibition of tobacco and by 1921, the manufacture or sale of tobacco
was prohibited in 15 states. Id.
3 Reducing the Health Consequences, supra note 2, at 5.
4 Id. at 12.
5 Id. at 5.
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mately thirty percent of all cancer related deaths in America have
been directly attributed to cigarette smoking. 6 It has been estimated that in 1985, 390,000 Americans died as a direct result of
smoking cigarettes. 7 In light of the mounting evidence, the Surgeon General of the United States described smoking to be one
of America's "deadliest risks." 8
Despite these grim statistics, more than fifty million Americans continued to smoke in 1989. 9 The American tobacco industry has traditionally enjoyed a unique immunity from liability for
smoking related personal injuries.' 0 Until recently, not one of
the series of smoking related injury suits filed since 1954 against
cigarette manufacturers has concluded adversely to the
industry. "
6 Id. at 5. Specifically, cigarette smoking is responsible for 87% of all reported
lung cancer cases. Id. Smoking alone has also been found responsible for 21% of
the deaths from heart disease, 18% of the deaths from stroke, and 82% of the
deaths as a result of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Id. Other diseases
associated with smoking include atherosclerotic peripheral vascular disease, oral
cancer, esophageal cancer, cancer of the bladder, kidney and pancreas, and cancer
of the stomach. Id. at 20.
7 Id. at 12.
8 Id. at iii.
9 Id. at 13. The effect of federal warning regulations and increased consumer
awareness of the health risks of smoking, however, has resulted in a significant decrease in the number of American cigarette smokers from the levels of the 1960's.
Id. The Surgeon General has found that the group with the largest decrease in
smoking during 1965-1987 was male smokers over the age of 20 (50.2% to 31.7%).
Id. at 23. Smoking among women, however, has shown little decrease (31.9% to
26.8%) and those smokers lacking a high school diploma have had no significant
decrease in numbers. Id.
10 Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S.CAL. L.
REV. 1423, 1423 (1980). Manufacturers of other products such as automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, and industrial equipment have not enjoyed such freedom from
2d 612, 210
civil litigation liability. Id. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.
N.E.2d 182 (1965) (truck tractor brakes); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (automobile steering); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20
Cal. 3d 417, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (fork lift loader); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)
(home combination power tool).
II Crist & Majoras, supra note 2, at 552. One recent case, however, did result in
a judgment against a cigarette manufacturer. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991), the jury rendered a
$400,000 verdict for Cipollone on a breach of express warranty claim. 693 F. Supp.
at 210. See infra notes 87-106 and accompanying text. Litigation in this area has
come in two "waves." Note, Tobacco Litigation: A Comparative Analysis of the United
States and European Community Approaches to Combatting the Hazards Associated with Tobacco Products, 16 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 275, 280-83 (1990). In the first wave, beginning in 1954 and ending in the late 1960's, none of the plaintiffs who brought tort
actions against cigarette manufacturers prevailed. Id. The second wave, beginning
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In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act (Cigarette Act) which required manufacturers to place labels warning of the possible health risks of smoking
on packages of cigarette products.' 2 Since the enactment of the
Cigarette Act, five federal courts of appeal have considered
whether cigarette manufacturers are liable for smoking related
injuries if the manufacturer has complied with the labeling requirements of the act.' 3 The consensus among the five courts
was that the concise warning label specified in the Cigarette Act
and required to be placed on packages of cigarette products preempted any state statutory or judicially-made laws which imposed
additional labeling requirements.' 4 Thus, it was generally bein the 1970's, resulted from the enactment of the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 286-89. Historically, the tobacco industry has been found liable only in suits concerning
foreign objects in the product, not for injury due to the effects of the normal components of the product. See Weiner v. D.A. Schulte, Inc., 275 Mass. 379, 176 N.E.
114 (1931) (product found to contain a nail); Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918) (human toe found in tobacco product); Dow Drug
Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936) (firecracker
found in tobacco product).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1331-41 (1988). For a discussion of the Cigarette Act and the
events leading up to its enactment, see infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
13 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted,
59 U.S.L..W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991) (claims relating to the adequacy of the
warning or appropriateness of advertising were preempted by the Cigarette Act)
(see infra notes 87-107 and accompanying text); Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876
F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989) (Cigarette Act preempted claims based on manufacturers,
failure to adequately warn; however, it did not preempt actions concerning failure
to warn before the Cigarette Act was enacted nor claims that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous); Roysdon v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.
1988) (failure to warn claim was preempted, and cigarettes were not defective or
unreasonably dangerous under state law); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d
620 (1st Cir. 1987) (reversing the district court in determining that state tort actions based on inadequate warning are preempted by the Cigarette Act); Stephen v.
American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11 th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's
ruling that actions concerning adequacy of warning was preempted).
14 Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 546 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d
181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987) (on interlocutory appeal, circuit court reversed trial court's granting of plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's
preemption defenses); Pennington, 876 F.2d at 420-2 1; Roysdon, 849 F:2d at 234-35;
Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626-27; Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313
(11 th Cir. 1987). Section 1333 of the Cigarette Act, entitled, "Labeling; requirements; conspicuous statement," prescribes the specific language required in the
warning. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). The original warning, first required in 1964,
provided: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking May Be Dangerous To Your Health." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964) (emphasis added). In 1970, the warning was strengthened by replacing "may be dangerous"
with "is dangerous". 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). As of 1984, cigarette products must
contain one of four possible warning labels. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (see supra note
1).
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lieved that because of the preemption provision of the Cigarette
Act, if manufacturers complied with the Act's labeling requirements they would be immune from any state law tort claim.' 5
Recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the
preemption issue in Dewey v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co. 16 and
stemmed the tide of federal opinions which held that state tort
law claims were preempted by the Cigarette Act.1 7 In Dewey, the
supreme court held that Dewey's strict liability claims for failure
to adequately warn of the health risks of smoking cigarettes and
for defective product design, as well as Dewey's claims for fraudulent and misrepresentative advertising, were not preempted by
the Cigarette Act.' 8 Additionally, the court determined that the
recently enacted New Jersey Products Liability Law (Products Liability Law) was not to be retroactively applied and thus, did not
bar Dewey's design defect claim which was brought prior to the
enactment of the New Jersey law. 19
In 1982, Claire Dewey, individually and as executrix of her
husband's estate, brought suit against several cigarette manufacSection 1334 of the Cigarette Act, entitled "Preemption," provides in full:
(a) Additional Statements
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any
cigarette package.
(b) State Regulations
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988).
16 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
15

17

Id.

18

Id. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251. A defect can exist due to defective manufactur-

ing, defective design or failure to warn of a product's hazards. PROSSER & KEETON,
THE LAw OF TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984). A strict liability claim alleging that

a product is defectively designed requires that the plaintiff establish that the product is defective, that the defect existed when the product was placed into the stream
of commerce, and that the product's defect wvas the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). Liability applies irrespective of the manufacturer's exercise of due care or the absence of
contract between the manufacturer and the consumer. Id.
19 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 100, 577 A.2d at 1255. The Products Liability Law, N.J.
STAT. ANN 2A: 58C-1 to 7 (West 1987) was enacted in 1987. Dewey initiated this
action in 1982. Dewey, 121 NJ. at 73, 577 A.2d at 1240-41.
No petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was filed because
the defendants instead decided to await the Supreme Court's decision on certiorari
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991). Telephone interview with William C. Slattery, Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, attorneys
for co-defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Mar. 5, 1991).
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turers, including Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company
(Brown).2" Dewey claimed that the use of Brown's cigarettes
from 1942 until 1980 had caused her husband to develop lung
cancer, and resulted in his death in 1980.21 Dewey sued on strict
liability theories of defective product design and inadequate
warning of the health risks of smoking, as well as on theories of
fraud and misrepresentation in advertising. 22 Brown moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that Dewey's state law claims
23
were preempted by the Cigarette Act.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, held that
Dewey's strict liability claims challenging the adequacy of the cigarettes' warning label and challenging Brown's advertising were
preempted by the Cigarette Act because the claims conflicted
with the Act's goals. 2 4 The trial court ruled that the Cigarette Act
20 Dewey v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 NJ. Super. 347, 350, 523 A.2d 712,
714 (Law Div. 1986), aff'd as modified sub nom. Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 375, 542 A.2d 919 (App. Div. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239
(1990). Dewey originally brought this action against RJ. Reynolds Co., R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., American Brands, Inc., and Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. Dewey v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 NJ. Super. at 349-50, 523 A.2d at
713. Brown moved for summary judgment. Id. at 349, 523 A.2d at 713. The trial
court granted the motion in part, id. at 355-56, 523 A.2d at 716, and denied the
motion in part. Id. at 358, 523 A.2d at 718. Both parties subsequently appealed
and the appellate division affirmed the earlier decision as modified. Dewey v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 NJ. Super. at 387-88, 542 A.2d at 926.
Both parties were granted leave to appeal and defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. was allowed to intervene. Dewey v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 NJ. at 7273, 75, 577 A.2d at 1240, 1242.
21 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. at 350, 523 A.2d at 714.
Although Dewey's complaint alleged that her husband had smoked defendants' cigarettes since 1942, Dewey revealed in discovery that the decedent had not begun to
smoke Brown's cigarettes until 1977, which was only three years before his death,
thirty-five years after he started smoking, and eleven years after the Cigarette Act
was enacted by Congress. Dewey v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 NJ. at 73, 577
A.2d at 1241.
22 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. at 351, 523 A.2d at 714.
23 Id. at 349, 523 A.2d at.713.
24 Id. at 354-55, 523 A.2d at 716. In reaching this decision, the trial court found
itself bound by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987),
on remand, 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.NJ. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991). Dewey v. RJ.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 NJ. Super. at 354-55, 523 A.2d at 716. The trial court
found that state courts are bound by federal interpretations of federal laws only
when the federal courts are in agreement. Id. at 353-54, 523 A.2d at 715. At the
time, however, while the federal district courts were split, Cipollone was the only
appellate court decision which had interpreted the Cigarette Act. Id. at 354, 523
A.2d at 715. For a discussion of Cipollone, see infra notes 87-107 and accompanying
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did not preempt Dewey's design defect claim, however, because
the effects of such a claim would not be in conflict with the goals
of the Cigarette Act.25 On appeal, the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, rejected Brown's new argument that
the recently enacted Products Liability Law barred Dewey's design defect claim 26 and affirmed on all counts.27 The appellate
court accepted Brown's argument that the Products Liability Law
was a codification of existing common law and was to be applied
retroactively, but decided that the statute did not bar Dewey's
claim. 28 The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Brown's and
Dewey's motions for leave to appeal.29
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed in
part and reversed in part.30 Justice Clifford, writing for the majority, affirmed the appellate court's decision that Dewey's design
defect claim was not preempted by the Cigarette Act. 3 ' The ma-

jority reversed the ruling that Dewey's failure to warn and misrepresentative advertising claims were preempted by the
Cigarette Act.3 2 Moreover, the court reversed the lower court's
25 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. at 356, 523 A.2d at 717.
The trial court limited its design defect decision to those design defect claims which
were not based upon inadequate warning or failure to warn theories. Id.
26 Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 375, 385-86,
542 A.2d 919, 924-25 (App. Div. 1988).
27 Id. at 387, 542 A.2d at 926. In affirming, the appellate court specifically declined to address the issue of whether the court was bound by the Third Circuit's
Cipollone decision, preferring to make an independent evaluation of the preemptive
effect of the Cigarette Act. Id. at 378, 542 A.2d at 920. Though convinced that the
trial court's decision was correct, the appellate court modified the risk utility standard which the trial court had determined to be the proper analysis for a design
defect claim. Id. at 387-88, 542 A.2d at 926. The proper standard, the appellate
court found, consisted of a modified risk utility analysis. Id. For a discussion of the
risk utility analysis, see infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
28 Id. at 385, 542 A.2d at 924-25. The Products Liability Law contains an exception to the general rule of strict liability for defective products if the injury results
from an inherently dangerous element of the product and if the inherently dangerous element is well known to the average consumer. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C3a(2) (West 1987). The appellate court rejected the applicability of the exception
to strict liability for "good tobacco" found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment i (1965). Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 N.J.
Super. at 385-86, 542 A.2d at 925. Recognizing the existence of variations in design, the court expressed its uncertainty as to whether the product was in fact
"good tobacco." Id.
29 Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 N.J. 379, 550 A.2d 481
(1988). The supreme court also allowed R.J. Reynolds to intervene. Id.
30 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 100, 577 A.2d 1239, 1255
(1990).
31 Id. at 100, 577 A.2d at 1255.
32 Id.
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finding that the Products Liability Law was to be retroactively
applied."
II.

BACKGROUND

Two obstacles have consistently frustrated plaintiffs in state
tort actions who hope to recover for cigarette smoking related
injuries.3 4 These legal hurdles are the preemptive power of the
Cigarette Act and the Restatement (Second) of Torts' (Restatement) exception to strict liability for any product with inherently
dangerous propensities whose dangers are known to the ordinary
consumer. 5 This section will discuss the background of each of
33 Id.
34 Crist & Majoras, supra note 2, at 552.

35 Id. Those appellate courts finding the Cigarette Act to have a preemptive
effect are listed in note 14. Trial courts include: Johnson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., No. H-86-1343 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1986); Ware v. Feist Watson Enterprises,
Inc., No. CV-85-203-M-CCL (D. Mont. Sept. 2, 1987); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-4294 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 2, 1987); Grinnell v. American Tobacco Co., No. E-122,878 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 28, 1987); Loving v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., No. 86-48386 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 1987); Tyson v. Monsanto Co.,
No. 85-CV-0682 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 17, 1987); Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., No. 3-30-86 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. July 17, 1987); Shopshire v. American Tobacco
Co., No. 1-66-87 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 1987); Sahli v. Manville Corp., No.
230512 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 1987); Weary v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., No.
283592 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 1987); Montana v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
No. 83-1382-A (M.D. La. Dec. 24, 1987). Focusing on the third circuit, the following decisions also consider the preemption issue: Gunsalas v. Celotex Corp., No.
85-1780 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1987); Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
No. 86-5913 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1987); Shorley v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.
86-0609 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1986); Ralicki v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. L055935-86 (NJ. Super. Law Div. Aug. 3, 1987); Reach v. American Tobacco Co.,
No. 1-08714-83 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Feb. 13, 1987). Flynn v. American Brands,
Inc., No. L006851-83 (NJ. Super. Law Div. Mar. 13, 1987).
The Restatement precludes liability for products which are impossible to make
absolutely risk free so long as the danger from the product is not more than that
contemplated by the ordinary consumer. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
comment i (1965). The Restatement provides that adequate warning labels may be
required to render the manufacturer of "unreasonably dangerous" products not
liable. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A commentj. A warning is necessary if
the risk of harm is not generally known or is one which the consumer would not
expect the product to contain, and the seller knows or ought to know of its existence. Id. Therefore, no warning is necessary for products with dangers of which
consumers are generally aware and which are a result of excess consumption or
prolonged use. Id.
Those decisions analyzing 402A's exceptions to strict liability include: Roysdon v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849
F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988), Tate v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 861824, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. June 23, 1987) (memorandum opinion published at 821
F.2d 650), Sahli v. Manville Corp., No. 230512 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 1987);
Johnson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. H-86-1343 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1986);
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these obstacles.
A.

The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and the
Supremacy Clause

The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was enacted by Congress as a result of the 1964 Surgeon General's Advisory Committee Report (Advisory Committee Report) on the
dangerous health consequences of smoking cigarettes.36 The
Advisory Committee Report spurred an immediate response
from the Federal Trade Commission, as well as state legislatures,
which proposed various regulations on the labeling, sale and advertising of cigarettes.3 7 While acknowledging that the individual
consumer should be allowed the freedom to choose whether or
not to smoke, Congress recognized the importance of informing
the consumer of the possible health risks involved in smoking.38
Furthermore, Congress wished to protect national commerce
and the tobacco industry from having to implement non-uniform
and diverse warning labels.39
Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 3-30-86 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. July 17, 1987);
Shopshire v. American Tobacco Co., No. 1-69-87 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 1987).
36 Reducing the Health Consequences, supra note 2, at 7. The Advisory Committee
consisted of objective scientific experts who evaluated data from current studies
and those performed in the past, to determine, in detail, the effect of smoking on
health. Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service v (Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare
1965). The result was a thorough report including information concerning those
benefits obtained from tobacco use, the chemical and physical characteristics of tobacco and tobacco smoke, an analysis of the tobacco habit, a study of cancers and
other diseases resulting from tobacco and smoking, and mortality rates according
to smoking habits, age, and sex. Id. at 14.
37 111 CONG. REC. 13,900-02 (daily ed. June 16, 1965) (statement of Sen. Moss).
The resulting extensive news coverage coupled with the highly respected and unbiased committee which released the report made it virtually impossible for the states
or Congress to ignore. Id.
38 H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2352.
39 Id. Congress enumerated its purposes in enacting the Cigarette Act in § 1331
which provides in full:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purposes of this chapter, to
establish a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect
on each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to
the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not
impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling
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Hence, in enacting the Cigarette Act, Congress promulgated
the first of a sequence of uniform warning labels which were required to be placed on all cigarette products manufactured for
consumption within the United States.4 ° To ensure that the prescribed warning had an all encompassing effect, Congress included a preemption provision in the Cigarette Act which
prohibited federal, state and local authorities from imposing additional labeling requirements on cigarette manufacturers. 4 It
was generally accepted by courts that the Cigarette Act preempted non-federal statutory and common law which required
warning labels on cigarette products.42
The power of federal legislation to preempt state statutory
and common law derives from the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution.4 3 A finding of preemption is almost
and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
In 1965, when the Cigarette Act was enacted, tobacco was one of America's
major industries. 11 CONG. REC. 13,897 (daily ed. June 16, 1965) (statement by
Sen. Bass). Approximately 70 million United States consumers spent $8 billion for
cigarettes and other tobacco products annually. Id. at 13,898. Moreover, 750,000
farm families grew the product and more than 96,000 people were directly involved
in manufacturing tobacco. Id. Additionally, in the 1960's, approximately 1.5 million businesses benefitted from the tobacco industry by retailing the product. Id.
As a result, the federal government annually collected more than $2 billion in tobacco excise taxes, state governments collected $1.2 billion and municipal governments collected more than $50 million. Id. The tobacco industry today employs
millions of workers and produces billions of dollars in state and federal tax revenues. Blum, Strategies to Reduce Cigarette Sales-Excise Taxes and Beyond, 8 J.A.M.A.
1049 (Feb. 28, 1986). In 1990, the tobacco industry grossed $79.6 billion in sales.
Roman, That Sinking Feeling Hits Business Again, BusINESS WEEK, March 18, 1991, at
62.
40 H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2352. Initially, § 1333 of the Cigarette Act warned: "Warning:
The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking May Be Dangerous
to Your Health." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964) (emphasis added). The warning was
subsequently strengthened in 1972 and 1988.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988). The provision currently provides that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter." 15
U.S.C. § 1334 (1988). After alternative remedial approaches were considered,
prompt congressional action was chosen to be the most effective answer. H.R. REP.
No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2350, 2352.
42 Five circuit courts have expressed agreement with the Cigarette Act's preemption. These courts are listed supra note 14.
43 Article VI, clause 2 provides in full:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
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exclusively a function of federal statutory construction. 44 Moreover, there is a presumption against preemption because of the
federalism-based premise that "Congress did not intend to displace state law." 4 5
Preemption can occur either expressly or impliedly. 46 A
state law will be expressly preempted by a federal law when Congress provides, within a statute, that state law is preempted. 47
Implied preemption, however, can occur in one of two ways. 48 A
federal law may impliedly preempt state law if Congress intended
to have exclusive authority and thus "occupy the field" in the
given subject matter.4 9 Alternatively, in those areas where an act
of Congress has not totally superseded state law, a state law may
also be impliedly preempted where it "actually conflicts" with
federal law. 50 The United States Supreme Court has held that an
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Recently, Congress has promulgated more federal legislation in areas traditionally regulated by the state. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 624 (1986).
44 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988).
45 Id. at 479 n.7 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). In
Maryland v. Louisiana, numerous pipeline companies were joined by several states,
the United States, as well as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in challenging the constitutionality of a 'first use' tax on any natural gas transported into
Louisiana. Mayland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 731 (1981). Plaintiffs claimed that the
tax violated the supremacy clause because the state tax interfered with federal commerce. Id. at 746. The Court emphasized that essential to the supremacy clause
analysis was the "assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law."
Id.
46 L. TRIBE, supra note 44, § 6-25, at 481 n.14. See California v. ARC America
Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
47 L. TRIBE, supra note 44, § 6-25, at 481 n.14.
48 Id. at 481.
49 Id. at 497-501. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has "occupied the
field" when Congress is found to have "left no room for the [s]tates to supplement" the federal regulation, because the act may concern a federal interest so
strong that "the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
50 L. TRIBE, supra note 44, § 6-26, at 481-97. Under this theory, it is not necessary that Congress actually intend a preemptive effect. Id. at 481 n.14. Federal
legislation, however, preempts only to the extent it conflicts with state law. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
204 (1983). See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963) (compliance with both federal and state avocado standards was possible);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state alien registration law an obstacle to
Congress's objectives).
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"actual conflict" occurs when application of state law would make
it impossible to accomplish the federal act's goals or would conflict with the federal act's purposes. 5 Reluctant to find that state
legislation is preempted when Congress enacts ambiguous legislation, the Supreme Court has required that the possibility of actual conflict be stronger than a mere potential and that a state law
stand as an obvious obstruction to congressional intent before it
will be preempted.52
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the availability of a damage award under state law can result in a
significant regulatory effect on a given field which, if in a federally regulated field, could result in an "actual conflict" with the
purposes of the federal laws and regulations.5 " In San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,54 the Court addressed the issue

of whether allowing state tort-based damage awards in a unionmanagement dispute conflicted with the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act. 55 In Garmon, the National Labor Relations
Board declined to hold proceedings to resolve a conflict where
unions sought to enter into an agreement with lumber distributors under which the distributors would employ only union members.56 The unions picketed the distributor's facilities and
pressured customers to stop dealing with the distributors. 5 ' The
51 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
52 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982). The "actual conflict" analysis requires first, that the purposes of the federal law be ascertained, and
second, that the effect of the state law on those purposes be assessed. Feinberg v.
Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980).
Historically, when Congress regulated a specific area, any state law which came
close to regulating the same subject was found to be per se invalid without any
analysis as to whether the state law duplicated the federal act, or whether it supplemented or conflicted with the act. L. TRIBE, supra note 44, § 6-26, at 491. With the
Supreme Court's subsequent repeated findings that Congress's key role is to protect the sovereignty of the states, however, there is presently "an overriding reluctance to infer preemption in ambiguous cases." Id. § 6-25, at 479-80. See Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (Court acknowledged a presumption that
Congress does not intend to preempt state law). But see Taylor v. General Motors
Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 826 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 10 S. Ct. 1781 (1990) (in an
express preemption analysis, there is a presumption against finding preemption,
but no such presumption exists in implied preemption analysis).
53 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
54 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
55 Id. at 239. The relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1975) regulate unfair labor practices, as well as protected
"concerted activities," including such instruments as the strike, picket line, and unsettled conflicts between the labor union and the employers. Id. at 241.
56 Id. at 237-38.
57 Id. at 237.
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California Supreme Court, basing its decision on state unfair labor practices law, awarded the distributors damages for lost business.58 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
awarding damages reflected state regulation in an area exclusively regulated by federal law. 59 As such, the Court ruled, the
damage award conflicted with the federal policy of having a national regulatory body decide labor relations issues and hence
the state action was preempted.6 °
Similarly, in Taylor v. General Motors Corp. ,61 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 62 (Safety Act) preempted
product liability tort claims against an automobile manufacturer
for failure to install an airbag crash protection system. 63 The
court found that the Safety Act and regulations passed pursuant
to it, provided automobile manufacturers with several options in
complying with the federal safety standards for automobile passenger crash protection.64 In addition to the installation of an
airbag restraint system, the appellate court asserted that the regulations allowed equipping the vehicle with a manual seat belt
58 Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473
(1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The first time this case came before the California Supreme Court, the court affirmed the injunction precluding defendant's conduct, as well as the $1,000 damages award. Id. at 597, 320 P.2d at 474. On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the Court vacated the decision and
remanded to the state court to reconsider in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957).
59 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246-47. The Garmon Court recognized that "regulation
can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of
preventative relief." Id. at 247.
60 Id. at 247. The Court noted, however, that the compelling state interest in
maintaining domestic order had allowed damage awards based on traditional state
tort law in those narrow instances where injuries were suffered as a result of violence and threats to public peace. Id. (citing United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347
U.S. 656 (1954)).
61 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990).
62 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-1431 (1988). The act regulates safety standards, research, inspection, cost
information, occupant restraint systems, procedure for defects and tire safety, and
penalties for noncompliance. Id.
63 Taylor, 875 F.2d at 817. Plaintiffs in Taylor, including personal representatives
of two motorists killed in separate automobile accidents, sought damages for failure
to equip the vehicles with airbags. Id. at 817. An airbag is an inflatable bag, concealed within the steering column and dashboard of an automobile, which inflates
rapidly upon collision and protects the occupant from the effects of the collision.
Id. at 817 n.3. The airbag subsequently deflates to allow the occupant to steer or to
exit the vehicle. Id.
64 Id. at 826.
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system.6 5 The circuit court found that allowing the plaintiff to
obtain damages from the manufacturer for failing to install an
airbag restraint system would have a significant regulatory effect
by eliminating the manufacturer's option to choose its crash restraint system. 66 Hence, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that this ac-

tual conflict with the federal regulatory scheme impliedly
preempted the plaintiffs' state tort law damages claim.6 7

Nevertheless, in an "actual conflict" preemption analysis,
the United States Supreme Court has determined that the "incidental" regulatory pressure exerted due to state tort claims may

be tolerated as long as it can be distinguished from "direct regulatory authority." 6 8 In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,69 Karen
Silkwood, a laboratory technician at a nuclear fuel processing
plant which was operating under federal license, was accidentally
contaminated by plutonium. 7' The jury found in favor of
Silkwood's estate, determining actual damages to be $505,000
and punitive damages to be $10 million. 7 ' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed both the personal injury and the punitive damages awards.7 2 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court found that the safety aspects of the
65 Id. at 827. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 was promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and provides in
part:
S4.1.2 Passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1973,
and before September 1, 1986. Each passenger car... shall meet the
requirements of...
S4.1.2.1 First option - frontal/angular automatic protection system

S4.1.2.2 Second option - head-on automatic protection system ...
S4.1.2.3 Third option - lap and shoulder belt protection system with
belt warning ....
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1990).
66 Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827.
67 Id.
68 Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186 (1988). See English v.
General Elec. Co., 110 S.Ct. 2270 (1990) (Court determined that an employee at a
nuclear power plant could bring an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
because it was found not to conflict with the regulation or remedies enacted in the
Energy Reorganization Act).
69 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
70 Id. at 241-42. Prior to bringing her negligence action, Karen Silkwood died
in an unrelated auto accident. Id. at 242. Her father brought the action as administrator of her estate. Id. at 243. Karen Silkwood's unfortunate story was related in
the movie "Silkwood," produced in 1983, starring Cher, Kurt Russell, and Meryl
Streep. Silkwood (ABC Motion Pictures 1983).
71 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 245. The $505,000 damages award included $500,000
for personal injuries, as well as $5,000 for property damage. Id.
72 Id. at 245-46.
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nuclear power field were exclusively regulated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission which was created pursuant to the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA).7 s Nonetheless, the Court reversed
the appellate court's ruling that the punitive damages awarded by
the jury were preempted by the AEA. 74 The majority found that
Silkwood's state tort claim was not preempted because Congress
had not intended the AEA to preclude those injured in nuclear
incidents from receiving compensatory or punitive damages.7 5
The Court recognized that state law damage awards had a regulatory -effect, but conceded that Congress was willing to accept such
incidental regulation.7 6
In other instances, courts have found that inadequate warning claims against manufacturers of products which are extensively regulated by federal law are not impliedly preempted. For
example, preemption in the pharmaceutical field was addressed
in MacDonald v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp., where the user of an
oral contraceptive and her spouse brought suit against the manufacturer for failing to include the risk of stroke in the contraceptive's warning label. 7'
The Supreme Judicial Court of
73 Id. at 256. Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284
(1988) to preclude states from regulating nuclear development safety because it
believed that the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) was better qualified than the states to determine adequate safety
standards in this complex field. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250.
74 Id. at 258. Utilizing a broad preemption interpretation, the court of appeals
had concluded that the consequence of a punitive damage award was not unlike a
direct legislative regulation and therefore was preempted by federal law. Id. at 246.
75 Id. at 250-51. The Court rationalized that it was unlikely that Congress would
preclude any compensation for those injured due to illegal conduct. Id. at 251.
76 Id. at 256. Essential to the Court's decision, however, was the tension created
by the conflicting messages regarding compensation for those injured in the
Atomic Energy Act and the Price-Anderson Act. Id. The Price-Anderson Act was
enacted in response to private companies' hesitation to enter the nuclear field for
fear of bankruptcy resulting from state law suits. Id. at 251. The Price-Anderson
Act limited the aggregate liability for accidents in nuclear facilities, implying that
the facilities may be liable for damages due to nuclear accidents. Id. at 253. The
act limited liability to $560 million per nuclear accident by establishing an indemnification plan in which nuclear power plant operators would need to be insured by
private insurers for up to $60 million for such suits, and the government would
indemnify the operators for the remaining $500 million of liability. Id. The Court
concluded that the resulting tension between the two acts precluded a finding of
preemption in the narrow area of radiation insurers. Id. at 256. Therefore,
although the Court allowed the state tort claims to stand in this instance, Silkwood's
rejection of preemption for incidental regulatory effect must be narrowly
interpreted.
77 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E:2d 65 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
78 MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 133-34, 475 N.E.2d at 67. MacDonald, at twentynine years of.age, had been using birth control pills for approximately three years
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Massachusetts found that although the United States Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations required that oral contraceptives contain nationally uniform warnings, complying manufacturers would not, be immune from liability for failing to
warn. 79 The court reasoned that the history of the FDA requirements on oral contraceptive labeling revealed that the FDA regulations did not have preemptive power. 80 The court concluded
that there was no preemption because the FDA commissioner
specifically noted that state law would define the boundaries of
liability for inadequate warning claims. 8 '
Federal preemption in the hazardous substances field was
addressed in Burch v. Amsterdam Corp.82 In Burch, a married
couple brought an action against the manufacturer of a floor tile
adhesive for failing to warn that, due to the extreme flammability
of the adhesive, all gas oven pilot lights in the area of use should
be extinguished.8" The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA)
required hazardous household substances to contain a specific
warning and instructions on the use of the substance. 84 The
court noted that the purpose of the FHSA was to protect the public from inherently dangerous elements of common household
products.8 5 Because the court found that the regulations implementing the statute prescribed only the minimum standard of
when she suffered a stroke resulting from a blood clot in the brain. Id. at 132-34,
475 N.E.2d at 66-67. The pill dispenser MacDonald received warned of side effects, the most severe being abnormal bloodclotting in vital organs including the
brain. Id. at 133, 475 N.E.2d at 66-67. The warning, however, did not include the
word "stroke." Id. at 133-34, 475 N.E.2d at 67. MacDonald testified that she
would not have used the pills had the warning included the risk of stroke. Id. at
134, 475 N.E.2d at 67.
79 Id. at 139-40, 475 N.E.2d at 70-71.
80 Id. at 139, 475 N.E.2d at 70.
81 Id. The FDA stated that its purpose was to inform the consumer; however, it
specified that compliance with uniform labeling would not shield a manufacturer
from liability concerning the warning's adequacy. 43 Fed. Reg. 4214, 4214 (1978).
82 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976).
83 Id. at 1081. The husband had carefully read and followed the instructions
that warned that the contents were flammable and therefore should not be applied
near a fire or flame. Id. The label required adequate ventilation and Burch opened
windows and turned on a large air conditioner and several fans. Id. Although
Burch made sure there were no flames in the kitchen in which he was tiling, he did
not extinguish the pilot light in the kitchen stove. Id. Consequently, a flash fire
resulted and Burch was severely burned. Id.
84 Id. at 1084-85. Providing for sanctions and criminal penalties for violation,
the act's primary purpose is to protect the consumers from the product's inherent
dangers. Id.
85 Id. at 1085.
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warning, the appellate court held that Burch's inadequate warning claims were not barred by the mere compliance of the manufacturer with the regulations.8 6
In Cippolone v. Liggett Group Inc. ,87 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit performed a preemption analysis
and addressed the issue of the preemptive power of the Cigarette
Act on state tort law claims. 8 8 In Cipollone, a husband brought
suit against a cigarette manufacturer and alleged that smoking
cigarettes caused his wife's lung cancer and subsequent death.8 9
Cipollone claimed, inter alia, that Liggett's product was defectively designed, that Liggett failed to adequately warn of the
health risks of smoking, and that Liggett's advertising fraudulently misrepresented the product by neutralizing any warning
which was provided on the cigarette package. 90 The district
court held that the Cigarette Act did not expressly or impliedly
preempt Cipollone's claim for failure to adequately warn. 9 '
On interlocutory appeal, the circuit court reversed and held
that those state law claims which related to the adequacy of the
warning and appropriateness of advertising were preempted by
the Act. 92 Examining the Cigarette Act under the two-part preemption analysis, the Third Circuit first determined that Congress did not expressly preempt state common law tort claims.93
Turning to the implied preemption analysis, the appellate court
noted that there was a presumption against finding preemption
of state laws when those laws deal with rights and remedies traditionally relegated to state law.9 4 This presumption, the court ex86 Id. at 1086. The court suggested that a manufacturer complying with the regulation, but with knowledge of risks not included in the warning, may be found
negligent for failure to adequately warn. Id.
87 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 693
F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991).
88 Id.
89 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984). Mrs. Cipollone had smoked
Liggett's cigarettes for more than forty years. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 183. After Mrs.
Cipollone's death, her husband maintained the suit individually and as executor of
her estate. Id.
90 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149. Cipollone sued on grounds of strict liability,
negligence, intentional tort and breach of warranty. Id.
91 Id. at 1170-71.
92 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
93 Id. at 185-86. The court noted that although the statutory preemption provision prohibited state and federal agencies from modifying or adding to the required warning, there was no reference in section 1334 to the prohibition of state
common-law claims. Id. See supra note 15 (text of section 1334).
94 Id. at 186.
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plained, required the court to take a restrained view of the
congressional intent, under which the court would be less inclined to find that Congress intended that the federal act "occupy
the field" or to determine that state laws "actually conflict" with
the Act's purposes and goals.95 The Cipollone court found that
the Cigarette Act's language did not manifest a congressional intent to exclusively control every facet of the relationship between
consumer health and cigarettes.96 Thus, the court ruled, the Act
did not "occupy the field" to preempt state law claims.97
In questioning whether an actual conflict would result from
implementing both the federal and state laws, however, the Third
Circuit concluded that the Cigarette Act could impliedly preempt
state law actions. 98 The court reached this conclusion by analyzing a state law action's effect on the purposes of the Cigarette
Act. 99 The Cigarette Act's purposes, the court determined, consisted of warning the consumer of the health risks of smoking
and protecting commerce and the national economy by precluding non-uniform labeling and advertising regulations. 0 The
court concluded that only under the "actual conflict" theory of
implied preemption did the Cigarette Act preempt state law actions challenging either the sufficiency of the product's warning
or the propriety of the manufacturers' advertising.10 ' The appellate court reasoned that any additional state imposed requirements would upset the "carefully drawn balance" of
95 Id. This restrained view of Congress's intentions to preempt state law is discussed in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (assumption
that states' police powers are not superseded when Congress legislates in a field
traditionally occupied by states); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 252-53 (1984) (the enactment of the Price-Anderson Act reveals Congress's
assumption that the Atomic Energy Act did not preclude injured parties from
bringing suit under state tort law); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (finding of preemption requires either obvious congressional intent or for the nature of the regulated field to allow no other conclusion).
96 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 187.
99 Id. The court utilized a two step "actual conflict" analysis, first finding the
congressional purpose and then determining the effect of state law on that purpose.
Id. The court emphasized that preemption should not be based on a mere potential
conflict between the state law and the congressional purposes. Id. at 188. Rather,
an actual obstruction to Congress's goal must be present. Id.
100 Id. at 187. See supra note 39 for congressional purposes listed in the Cigarette
Act.
101 Id. In addressing only the failure to warn and misrepresentative advertising
claims, the court significantly left a gap in the Cigarette Act's preemptive power
regarding a design defect claim. See id.
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congressional policies.' 0 2 Having established the appropriate
preemption analysis, the Third Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for application of the analysis to Cipollone's
0 3
claims. 1
On remand, the district court interpreted the circuit court's
holding to mean that the Cigarette Act impliedly preempted Cipollone's claims of failure to warn and of misrepresentative advertising. 10 4 To allow the claims, the court concluded, could
result in conflict with the purpose and goals of the Cigarette
Act.' 0 5 The district court's rulings were subsequently affirmed
10 6
on appeal.

The federal circuit courts addressing this issue have agreed
with the Cipollone holding that state tort liability would upset the
balance of the two independent purposes detailed in the Cigarette Act.' 0 7 Consequently, plaintiffs bringing actions against
cigarette manufacturers for smoke related injury have been precluded from compensation on failure to warn and misrepresentative advertising claims.
B.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts Strict Liability Exception
The second obstacle facing plaintiffs who hope to recover

Id.
Id. at 188.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.NJ. 1986). The court
held, however, that the act only preempted such actions where the plaintiff smoked
after its enactment. Id. Nevertheless, the district court ruled that Cipollone's
breach of express warranty claim and any other claims were not preempted. Id.
Subsequently, the jury rendered a $400,000 verdict for Cipollone based upon
breach of express warranty. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 555.
105 Id.
106 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted,59
U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991).
107 Those circuit courts include the Fifth Circuit, Pennington v. Vistron Corp.,
876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989); the Sixth Circuit, Roysdon v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); the First Circuit, Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825
F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); and the Eleventh Circuit, Stephen v. American Brands,
825 F.2d 312 (11 th Cir. 1987). See supra note 14. Lower courts, however, have not
been as uniform in their holdings. The district courts in both Palmer v. Liggett
Group, 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987) and
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d
181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991), determined
the Cigarette Act to have no preemptive effect; both decisions, of course, were reversed on appeal. See also Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd in part, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) (state intermediate appellate court concluded that if the tobacco industry is to be immunized from
tort liability, it must be done by Congress through an unambiguous provision and
not by the courts).
102
103
104
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under a design defect claim for smoking-related injury is the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) exception to strict liability for products which the ordinary consumer knows to be
inherently dangerous.108 The Restatement generally holds manufacturers and sellers of defective products strictly liable for
damage caused to the consumer or his property by the defective
products. 0 9 Strict liability may apply for a defective product if
there is a manufacturing defect, if the manufacturer failed to adequately warn of the risk of using the product, or if there is a
defect in the product's design."° The Restatement commentary
recognizes, however, that many products are incapable of being
entirely safe for consumer use or consumption and provides an
exception to strict liability for those products with inherently
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (RESTATEMENT) § 402A, comment i. Comment i provides in part: "the rule stated.., applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." Id.
The Comment was incorporated in New Jersey Products Liability Law, NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1987). The New Jersey Law included comment
i's exception to strict liability in the following provision:
(a) In any product liability action against a manufacturer or seller for
harm allegedly caused by a product that was designed in a defective
manner, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:

(2) The characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user, and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the
product that is an inherent characteristic of the product and that
would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses or consumes
the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for whom the product is intended....
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1987).
109 RESTATEMENT § 402A. The Restatement provides in part:
[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT

§ 402A(1).

Three policy reasons motivated the American Law Institute to adopt strict liability for products that are in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 98, at 692-93. The reasons include: 1) manufacturers are better able to bear the costs of defective products because they can
readily shift the cost on to the consumer by charging higher prices, 2) strict liability
promotes accident prevention, and 3) fault and negligence are often difficult to
prove. Id. Strict liability for defective products is nearly universal: the only jurisdictions that as of 1986 had not adopted the provision are Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Id. § 98, at
694 n. l1.5 (5th ed. Supp. 1988).
110 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 99, at 695.
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dangerous characteristics when those characteristics are universally known by the average consumer."'
Judicial interpretation of the Restatement's strict liability
provision has resulted in the development of two separate legal
standards to be applied in design defect cases: the consumer expectations test and the risk utility test. 1 2 The consumer expectations analysis adopted the language of the Restatement
commentary and deems a product to be defectively designed in
the unreasonably dangerous context if the product is more dangerous than the ordinary consumer, with knowledge commensurate to that of the community, would expect the product to be.' '3
The New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the consumer expectations analysis in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry and Machine Co. 14
In Suter, the plaintiff sought damages from the manufacturer of a
sheet metal rolling machine for injuries he incurred when his
hand became caught in the rollers of the machine.'
The court
found that Suter, as an experienced sheet metal worker, was well
versed in every aspect of the machine's constituent parts and its
operation."1 6 Because of Suter's intimate knowledge of the rolling machine, the court reasoned that Suter would have difficulty
establishing that the possibility of having his hand caught in the
I II RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i. The comment exemplifies this theory with
specific reference to exceptions for good whiskey, tobacco, and butter, all of which
may be harmful in excess or in adulterated form. Id.
112 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 99, at 698.
113 RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i. Comment i provides in part: "[tihe article
sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i. Many
courts have used the standard of an "ordinary user" or "foreseeable user" rather
than "ordinary purchaser" to expand protection to non-purchasers. See Bellotte v.
Zayre Corp., 116 N.H. 52, 352 A.2d 723 (1976) (child injured by flammable pajama
purchased by parents); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1976) (employee
injured by scaffolding); Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Ct. App.
1978) (patient injured by breast prothesis purchased by doctor). The consumer
expectations test has been criticized as an inadequate analysis on the grounds that:
1) a victim is precluded from recovery for obvious hazards or a danger of which the
consumer is adequately warned, 2) the analysis can erroneously deem products
dangerous which are in fact not, and 3) the analysis is ambiguous and difficult to
apply. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 99, at 698-99.
114 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
115 Suter, 81 N.J. at 154, 406 A.2d at 141. While the rollers were stopped, Suter
reached into the machine to extract a piece of slag (scrap metal) and accidently
brushed against the gear shift, placing the rollers in motion. Id. at 156-57, 406
A.2d at 143. The court stated that the manufacturer had a duty to prevent such
accidents and ruled that public policy would not allow Suter's claim to be barred by
his purported contributory negligence. Id. at 167, 406 A.2d at 148.
116 Suter, 81 N.J. at 165, 406 A.2d at 147.
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rollers was not an "unreasonable expectation."" 7 The consumer
expectations analysis would, therefore, according to the court, be
ineffective in providing Suter with a remedy." 8
The second means of analyzing a defectively designed product for strict liability purposes, the risk utility analysis, deems a
product defective if the magnitude of the product's danger outweighs the product's utility."l 9 The risk utility analysis applies an
objective standard in determining whether a product is so unreasonably dangerous as to deem it "defective" and render the manufacturer strictly liable. 120 Consequently, a product may be
determined to be defective in the "unreasonably dangerous"
sense if a reasonable person would find that the risk of harm outweighed the product's social utility. 12' Moreover, if there is a
safer alternative available, a product is considered defectively
designed even though the product's utility may outweigh the risk
of harm.122 The Supreme Court of NewJersey applied a risk utility analysis in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. 123 O'Brien involved a twentythree year old man who was injured when he struck his head after
diving into an above-ground swimming pool containing three
and a half feet of water.124 O'Brien sued the pool manufacturer,
117 Id. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150. The court recognized that public policy could
not allow a manufacturer to place a defectively designed product into the stream of
commerce without incurring liability and applied a risk utility analysis. Id. at 17174, 406 A.2d at 150-52. The supreme court ultimately affirmed the appellate
court's ruling awarding Suter $25,000. Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
118 Suter, 81 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150. Other courts have similarly provided an alternative analysis because of the inadequacy of the consumer expectations analysis. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d
443 (1978); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
119 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 99, at 699. The rationale of this theory is
that nearly all products offer both risks and benefits. To evaluate design defect
hazards, therefore, the appropriate analysis includes weighing danger against utility. Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. This analysis ignores whether the manufacturer perceived or should have
perceived the danger because the focus is on the product itself rather than the manufacturer's conduct. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110, 114
(La. 1986).
122 Halphen, 484 So.2d at 115. A safer alternative may be found in another product or in the same product, but utilizing a different design. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 18, § 99, at 699-700. Most litigation concerns an alternative design
available to defendant. Id. Dean Wade acknowledged that under a risk utility analysis, the plaintiff does not need to prove the defendant's scienter and therefore the
analysis merely questions "whether the defendant was negligent to people who
might be harmed by [the] condition if they came into contact" with the product.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 835 (1973).
123 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
124 Id. at 177-78, 463 A.2d at 302. There was evidence that O'Brien dove from
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alleging that the manufacturer was strictly liable for placing a defectively designed product into the stream of commerce and for
failing to warn of the risks in using the pool.

25

The trial court

26
did not allow the jury to decide O'Brien's design defect claim.'
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the
pool had fulfilled the "reasonable expectations" of the ordinary
consumer, namely as a place in which to swim, and hence found
that the consumer expectations analysis would not apply. 1 7 Instead, the O'Brien court deemed the appropriate analysis to be
the risk utility analysis and affirmed the use of the factors that the
court had previously established.' 28 Those factors relevant to the
risk utility analysis, the court recounted, include the product's
utility, the likelihood and degree of injury which the product will
cause, the availability of an alternative product, the manufacturer's ability to reduce costs relating to the product's danger
while retaining its utility, the consumer's ability to avoid the danger by exercising care in the product's use, the consumer's
awareness of the product's dangers (manifested by obvious dangers or those warned of by the existence of warnings) and the
manufacturer's ability to absorb the costs of liability.' 2 9 After
the top of an eight-foot high garage which was adjacent to the pool and not from
the pool platform as O'Brien claimed. 94 NJ. at 178, 463 A.2d at 302.
125 Id. at 175, 463 A.2d at 301. O'Brien alleged that the pool floor material was
so slippery that when his hands hit the bottom of the pool, they slid apart, allowing
his head to hit the bottom of the pool with great force. Id. at 178, 463 A.2d at 302.
With respect to O'Brien's inadequate warning claim, the court noted that the outer
section of the pool structure contained a warning "DO NOT DIVE" in letters approximately one-half inch high. Id. at 177-78, 463 A.2d at 302.
126 Id. at 176, 463 A.2d at 301. The trial court determined that O'Brien had not
met his burden of proof for a design defect claim and thus limited its charge to the
jury on the adequacy of the warning. Id. Interestingly, the court's special interrogatories to the jury reflected a design defect, rather than an adequacy of warning,
charge. Id. at 176, 463 A.2d at 301-02. Thejury found that the pool was unreasonably dangerous, that the defect in design existed when the product left the defendant's hands, and that the defect was the cause of injury. Id. Nevertheless, the jury
found for Muskin, because O'Brien was deemed guilty of contributory negligence
and thus barred from recovery. Id. at 176-77, 463 A.2d at 302. The appellate division reversed the judgment, finding that the trial court erred in disallowing the
design defect instruction. Id. at 177, 463 A.2d at 302.
127 Id. at 181-82, 463 A.2d at 304.
128 Id. at 181-82, 463 A.2d at 304-05. In Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., the
supreme court adopted the risk utility factors promulgated by Dean Wade. 76 N.J.
152, 171, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978) overruled, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
129 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 182, 463 A.2d at 304-05 (citing Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173-74, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978), overruled, Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979)). Additionally, the
court emphasized that the "risk-utility analysis is not a petrified, but a dynamic pro-
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evaluating O'Brien's claims in light of the risk utility factors, the
supreme court ruled that the jury may have found that the pool's
utility was outweighed by the risks posed by the pool's design.' 30
Therefore, the court remanded for a new trial to allow O'Brien to
have the design defect charge given to thejury.' 3 ' Because plaintiffs often have difficulty overcoming the burden of establishing,
in a consumer expectations analysis, that the danger which they
allege was beyond the consumer's reasonable expectations, many
courts have allowed the plaintiff to use the risk utility analysis as
an alternative means to establish a strict liability design defect
claim. 132

In 1987, New Jersey adopted the strict liability provisions of
the Restatement by enacting the Products Liability Law. 13 3 In the
Products Liability Law, the legislature specified provisions that
were mere codifications of existing law be applied retroactively,
while those provisions which created new rules were to be applied prospectively. 34 Since its enactment on July 22, 1987,
seven reported cases have interpreted the New Jersey Products
35
Liability Law.'
cess" determined "on a case-by-case basis." O'Brien, 94 NJ. at 183, 463 A.2d at
305.
130 Id. at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 306.
13 Id. at 188, 463 A.2d at 308. Interestingly, Justice Clifford in a concurring
opinion, scolded the majority for "breath[ing] life into the cadaver of the 'consumer expectations' test for a design defect .
I..."
Id. (Clifford, J., concurring).
132 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 99, at 702.
133 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-1 to 7 (West 1987).
'34 1987 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 188, 193 (West). The section explains "that the bill
will take effect immediately but that the provisions of the act which establish new
rules with respect to the burden of proof or the imposition of liability in product
liability actions shall apply only to actions filed on or after the effective date." Id.
135 Those seven cases interpreting the Products Liability Law include: Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483
(U.S. Mar. 25, 1991). See supra notes 87-107 and accompanying text; Snyder v.
Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. 281, 290-93, 582 A.2d 307, 312-13 (App. Div. 1990)
(blood bank supplying blood contaminated with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome is not strictly liable because the level of error in screening at that time made
the supply unavoidably unsafe and strict liability does not apply for a hospital which
receives a latently defective product from a third party for treatment); Shackil v.
Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 187-88, 561 A.2d 511, 527-28 (1989) (court
found its decision to reject theory of risk-modified market-share liability for manufacturers of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine to be consistent with the Product
Liability Law goal to balance the interests of those injured with those of the public,
while maintaining "economic reality"); Bottignoli v. Ariens Co., 234 NJ. Super.
353, 361, 560 A.2d 1261, 1265 (App. Div. 1989) (Products Liability Law found not
to apply retroactively for claims of inadequate warning and defective snowblower
design in an action filed before the law's enactment); Niemiera by Niemiera v.
Schneider, 114 N.J. 550, 561-62, 555 A.2d 1112, 1118 (1989) (in an action against a
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CHANGE IN THE TIDE

It was in this maelstrom that the New Jersey Supreme Court
decided Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 36
' In Dewey, the New
Jersey Supreme Court took an independent stand on the preemptive power of the Cigarette Act on state tort actions and held
3 7
that the Act did not preempt any of Dewey's state tort claims.'
Further, the court ruled that the New Jersey Products Liability
Law promulgated a new legal analysis in design defect actions
13 8
and that the law was not to be applied retroactively.
A.

Preemption and the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act

Because the Third Circuit had previously held that failure to
warn claims and misrepresentative advertising claims were preempted by the Cigarette Act, Justice Clifford, writing for the majority, initially reviewed whether lower federal court decisions
interpreting federal statutes were binding on the state supreme
court.' 3 9 The court noted that, pursuant to the doctrine of stare
decisis, New Jersey courts had traditionally followed federal interpretations of federal legislation. 4 ' Nevertheless, the majority
emphasized the distinction between the compulsory binding authority of United States Supreme Court decisions on state courts,
and the less persuasive authority of lower federal court decisions.' 4 ' In declining to be bound by the Third Circuit Cipollone
manufacturer of a vaccine for allegedly resulting injury, court utilized Products Liability Law to support theory that there is no liability for a warning defect if an adequate warning is attached when the product leaves the manufacturer); Perth Amboy
Iron Works, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co., 226 N.J. Super. 200, 226-27,
543 A.2d 1020, 1034 (App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 118 N.J. 249, 571 A.2d 294 (1990)
(remedies are appropriate under the Uniform Commercial Code rather than under
negligence or strict liability when a commercial buyer suffers purely economic loss);
and In re Ass'n of Trial Lawyers, 228 N.J. Super. 180, 188, 549 A.2d 446, 450-51

(App. Div. 1988), cert. denied, 113 N.J. 660, 552 A.2d 180 (1988) (New Jersey Chapter of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, in an attempt to challenge the
constitutionality of Products Liability Law, was found not to have standing to protect rights of third parties).
136 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
137 Id. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251.

138
139
140
A.2d

Id. at 96, 100, 577 A.2d at 1252, 1255.
Dewey, 121 N.J. at 78, 577 A.2d at 1243.
Id. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Wheaton Brass Works, 5 N.J. 594, 598, 76
890, 892 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).

141 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 79-80, 577 A.2d at 1243-44. In making this conclusion, the
court relied on Southern Pac. Co. v. Wheaton Brass Works, 5 N.J. 594, 76 A.2d 890
(1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951) and State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d
393 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966). In Wheaton Brass Works, the court recognized only United States Supreme Court decisions to be binding, not those of
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decision on the preemptive power of the Cigarette Act, Justice
Clifford distinguished the principle ofjudicial comity from that of
stare decisis. 412 The majority explained that while judicial comity
required that due respect be given to lower federal court decisions, strict conformity was not required. 4 ' Because the court
opted not to follow Cipollone, the justice declared that an independent analysis of the Cigarette Act was necessary to properly determine its preemptive effect.' 44 In scrutinizing the
statute, Justice Clifford indicated that Congress's purpose in
promulgating the Act was two-fold.' 45 The first goal of the Act,
the majority contended, was to create a comprehensive program
to adequately inform the public of the health hazards of smoking
cigarette products.' 4 6 A second goal of the Act, Justice Clifford
posited, was to protect national commerce and the tobacco industry by preventing states from imposing non-uniform and diverse cigarette labeling requirements
upon
cigarette
manufacturers. 147 The court also recognized that the preemption provision of the Cigarette Act seemingly barred the imposition of state-mandated requirements
upon the advertising and
48
promotion of cigarette products.

lower federal courts. 5 N.J. at 598, 76 A.2d at 892. In fact, in Coleman, the court
explained, "when adjudicating federal questions, the state courts form an integral
part of the national structure and thus, the state courts are not inferior, but in fact
equal to lower federal courts." 46 N.J. at 37, 214 A.2d at 404.
The Dewey majority went so far as to extend state courts' authority to reject
lower federal court statutory and constitutional interpretations. Dewey, 121 N.J. at
79-80, 577 A.2d at 1244.
142 Id. at 80, 577 A.2d at 1244.
143 Id. Justice Clifford noted that due respect is required particularly where the
federal courts are in agreement. Id. The court also recognized that judicial comity
discourages litigants from forum shopping. Id.
144

Id.

Id. at 81, 577 A.2d at 1245.
Id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248. See supra note 39 for an enunciation of congressional purposes.
147 Dewy, 121 N.J. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248.
148 Id. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249. Section 1334 of the Cigarette Act provides in
part: "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988). It was the Cigarette Act's preemption provision which had been interpreted to preempt other plaintiff's smoking related injury
claims. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 563 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991); Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876
F.2d 414, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d
230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626-27
(1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir.
1987).
145
146
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Despite having concluded that the court was not bound by
any prior decisions on the preemptive force of the Cigarette Act,
Justice Clifford reviewed the history of smoking-related injury litigation, specifically focusing on the Third Circuit decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 149 The court noted that, in applying
the preemption analysis, the circuit court held that the Cigarette
150
Act did not expressly preempt state common law actions.
Moreover, the majority noted that the circuit court ruled that the
Act impliedly preempted only those state tort claims that actually
conflicted with the purposes of the Cigarette Act. 15 ' Additionally, the justice acknowledged that the Third Circuit's subsequent
finding of implied preemption with respect to the adequacy of
warning and propriety of advertising claims was consistent with
1 52
the decisions of the federal circuit courts.
Although declining to follow the Cipollone holding, Justice
Clifford subsequently applied the Third Circuit court's preemption analysis to Dewey's claims.15 Recognizing that state law can
often coexist with federal law, the court stated that a clear congressional intent was required to prove otherwise.' 5 4 The majority summarily dismissed the defendants' argument that Dewey's
claims were expressly preempted, concluding that the defendants
had not established'a clear congressional intent to preempt state
law actions with the Cigarette Act. 1 5 5 Thus, the New Jersey
Supreme Court agreed with the federal circuit courts which had
held that the Cigarette Act did not expressly preempt state tort
149 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 82, 577 A.2d at 1245. See supra notes 87-107 and accompanying text.
150 Id. (citation omitted).
151 Id. at 83, 577 A.2d at 1246.
152 Id. at 83-84, 577 A.2d at 1246. Specifically, the Cipollone decision found favor
with the First, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts. See supra note 148.
Although in Cipollone the appellate court remanded to the district court to determine which claims conflicted, on a subsequent appeal the court affirmed the district
court's ruling that the inadequate warning and misrepresentative advertising claims
were preempted by the Cigarette Act. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d
541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.'granted,59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991).
Justice Clifford duly noted that several lower federal courts and various state
courts have not been as consistent in their decisions. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 84-85, 577
A.2d at 1246-47. For those cases which did not find preemption, but were later
reversed on appeal, see siipra note 107.
153 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 86-88, 577 A.2d at 1247-48.
154 Id. at 85, 577 A.2d at 1247. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 75 (1941)
(Stone, J., dissenting) (courts must protect against the reduction of state power
based on "vague inferences").
155 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 86, 577 A.2d at 1247. Brown had relied, Justice Clifford
found, on "dubious inferences and assertions." Id.
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law claims.' 5 6
Analyzing Dewey's claims under the two theories of implied
preemption, the majority was once again in accordance with the
circuit courts which had held that the Cigarette Act did not "occupy the field" of cigarette manufacturer liability. 157 The court,
however, diverged from the federal appellate level decisions in
reaching its independent conclusion that state law design defect
claims for inadequate warning did not actually conflict with the
congressional purposes outlined in the Cigarette Act.' 5 8
Justice Clifford began his "actual conflict" preemption analysis by asserting that the analysis was, in actuality, more an exercise in making public policy choices than an exercise in statutory
construction. 59 The justice posited that the "actual conflict"
analysis consisted of: (1) ascertaining the purposes of the Cigarette Act, and (2) subsequently evaluating the effect of state tort
law actions on those purposes. 160
Of the two purposes expressed by Congress in the Act, Justice Clifford contended that the goal of protecting the consumer's health by providing adequate health risk warning labels
was the primary congressional purpose.' 6 ' Consequently, the
156 Id. at 86, 577 A.2d at 1247. The majority made specific reference to the First,
Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541,
563 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991); Pennington
v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
825 F.2d 620, 626-27 (1st Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Stephen v.
American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11 th Cir. 1987) was not included for support,
because its holding was limited solely to a denial of a motion to strike a defense of
preemption, and thus the court did not perform a preemption analysis. See Stephen,
825 F.2d at 313.
157 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 86, 577 A.2d at 1247 (citations omitted).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 86-87, 577 A.2d at 1247.
160 Id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1247. The court recognized that the actual conflict
determination required there to be more than a "hypothetical" or "potential" conflict. Id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1247-48 (citing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S.
654, 659 (1982)).
161 Id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248. The court relied in part upon a congressional
report which stated that the "principal" purpose of the Act was to "provide adequate warning to the public of the potential hazards of cigarette smoking by requiring the labeling of cigarette packages with the [warning]." Id. (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2350, 2350). Justice Clifford, however, failed to acknowledge that the report recognized agreement among the witnesses who testified before the committee for a uniform labeling requirement, because "otherwise, a multiplicity of [s]tate and local
regulations pertaining to labeling of cigarette packages could create chaotic marketing conditions and consumer confusion." H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2352.
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majority noted, the goal of protecting national commerce by precluding states from imposing regulations with different labeling
requirements must naturally be a "secondary," and hence less
important, congressional purpose. 6 2 Justice Clifford stated that
Congress did not intend to have uniform warning labels work to
the detriment of the primary goal-informing the public of the potential health dangers of cigarette smoking.163
The
"subordinate" purpose of protecting commerce and the national
tobacco industry, the majority concluded, was focused strictly on
uniform label regulations and did not extend to restricting the
state law rights of consumers injured by cigarette smoke." 6
Having ascertained the "proper" congressional purposes for
enacting the Cigarette Act, the majority asserted that the remaining task was to evaluate the effect which Dewey's state tort claims
would have on the Act's purposes. 165 Justice Clifford concluded
that allowing state tort remedies would further, not handicap, the
Cigarette Act's fundamental purpose of informing the public of
the health risks of smoking.' 66 The court noted, however, that
the effect of state tort law remedies on the second goal of national uniform labeling regulations was less straightforward.' 67
Justice Clifford recognized Brown's argument that an adverse
jury verdict could require that the manufacturer modify or supplement the current warning label.' 68 This potential regulatory
effect, the court posited, could conceivably conflict with the Cigarette Act's purpose of protecting the national commerce by requiring uniform label regulations. 169 To ascertain whether a
conflict would occur, the court reviewed United States Supreme
Court decisions which addressed the regulatory effect of state
tort actions and concluded that the case law was not dispositive
Dewey, 121 N.J. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248.
Id.
164 Id. Judge Antell disputed this theory in his dissent.
165 Id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248.
166 Id. at 87-88, 577 A.2d at 1248.
167 Id. at 88, 577 A.2d at 1248.
168 Id.
169 Id. The court acknowledged that in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d
620 (1st Cir. 1987), the First Circuit concluded that "[o]nce a jury has found a label
inadequate under state law, and the manufacturer liable for damages for negligently employing it, it is unthinkable that any manufacturer would not immediately
take steps to minimize its exposure to continued liability." Id. (quoting Palmer, 825
F.2d at 627-28). It was exactly this effect that led the Palmer court to find that
Palmer's claims actually conflicted with the federal scheme. Palmer, 825 F.2d at
628.
162
163
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of the issue. 7 ' Although the majority conceded that the
Supreme Court had, in some instances, recognized that state laws
may have some regulatory effect, Justice Clifford rejected the assumption that all state7 law
claims would therefore be preempted
1
by the Cigarette Act.'
Accordingly, the Dewey majority conducted an independent
determination of the actual regulatory degree which state tort
claims would have on the Cigarette Act's goal of uniform national labeling. 7 2 The court noted that, in the absence of injunctive or declaratory relief, finding a manufacturer liable would
merely be providing an incentive for the manufacturer to make a
change in its warning label. 173 The court explained that the manufacturer would have the option of either providing a more comprehensive warning than the federal legislation required or
simply risk liability by retaining the current warning. 174 By thus
allowing the manufacturer to "voluntarily" provide an additional
or different warning label, the majority contended there would
be no conflict with the Cigarette Act's prohibition against "re170 Id. at 88-89, 577 A.2d at 1248-49. The court distinguished the Supreme
Court's decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959) (holding that a state law action for business losses incurred as a result of
union picketing was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act), on the basis
that there was a presumption favoring federal preemption in actions concerning the
National Labor Relations Board. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 88-89, 577 A.2d at 1248. Justice Clifford contended that the Silkwood opinion (discussed supra at notes 69-76
and accompanying text) and the Supreme Court's decision in English v. General
Electric Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990), suggested that the incidental regulatory effect
of state law actions on federal purposes would be acceptable. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 8990, 577 A.2d at 1248-49. In English, a nuclear fuel production facility employee
fired for "whistleblowing" filed a state law based claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. English, 110 S. Ct. at 2273-74. The English Court held that the
state law claim was not preempted by the Energy Reorganization Act, despite the
incidental regulatory effect of the plaintiff's claim on the defendant's actions. Id. at
2278-79.
171 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 89-90, 577 A.2d at 1249.
172 Id.
173 Id. One theory ofjustification which Justice Clifford relied upon was the fact
that a damages award requires monetary payment and is not an injunction forcing
the labeler to incorporate a different warning. Id. (citing Garner, supra note 10, at
1454); but see Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir. 1988) cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990) (state common law actions are impliedly preempted
because they would effectively circumvent the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act's "prohibition of nonidentical state standards"),
174 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249. But see Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987) (manufacturer's alternatives to changing the
warning label, in reaction to successful tort claims, is "akin to the free choice of
coming up for air after being under water"). Judge Antell also rejects the majority's conclusion in his dissent. See infra note - and accompanying text.
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quiring" additional or different warnings.' 75
Continuing its analysis, the majority found that the policy of
compensating consumers who were injured by defective products
was an important goal separate from the goals of warning the
consumer and protecting national commerce via uniform warning label regulations. 176 Justice Clifford premised this finding on
the state's strong interest in providing compensation to those
harmed by defective goods; the state's interest in allocating the
risk of liability to the cheapest cost avoider, the manufacturer;
and on the state's interest in minimizing the costs of defective
products by determining who should bear those Costs. 17 7 Justice
Clifford agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. ,178 in which
the manufacturer of paraquat was held liable under a failure to
warn claim even though the manufacturer had complied with the
labeling requirements of the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).' 79 Justice Clifford noted that Ferebee
stood for the proposition that a state court could find a manufacturer liable for harm that may have been prevented if the manufacturer had provided a more comprehensive warning label than
that required by the federal legislation.' 80 The majority agreed
with the Ferebee court's finding that although a federal statute may
175 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90, 577 A.2d 1249.
176 Id. at 90-91, 577 A.2d at 1249 (citations omitted).
177 Id. at 91, 577 A.2d at 1249-50. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169,
179, 463 A.2d 298, 303 (1983) (strict liability theory based on allocating the risk of
loss to those in the stream of commerce for injuries due to unsafe products); Suter
v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 173-74, 406 A.2d 140, 151-52
(1979) (strict liability found to be appropriate because the manufacturer is in a better position to make determinations as to whether foreseeable damage costs outweigh the cost to avoid such accidents, and then to implement its conclusion).
178 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
179 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 91, 577 A.2d at 1250 (citation omitted). FIFRA is a comprehensive act covering all aspects of the research, registration, manufacture, sales,
distribution and administration of pesticides. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 to 136v (1988). A
copy of the prospective label is required to be submitted for approval by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency at time of registration. 7
U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(C) (1988). FIFRA contains a preemption provision providing
in part: "[s]uch [s]tate shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for
labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter." 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
In Ferebee, an employee alleged that his employer had failed to warn him of the
risks of long-term exposure to paraquat. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1532. Ferebee, an
agricultural worker, suffered from pulmonary fibrosis which allegedly resulted from
his long-term exposure to paraquat. Id. at 1531-32. Paraquat is a toxic herbicide
known to cause severe injury when directly absorbed into the body. Id. at 1532.
180 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 91-92, 577 A.2d at 1250.
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have the goal of uniform warning label requirements, a "state
tort law 'may have broader compensatory goals' than the federal
scheme."' 8 '
The Dewey court quickly dispensed with Brown's argument
that Dewey's claims were preempted because the claims had a
significant regulatory effect.' 82 Justice Clifford observed that
Brown's argument could just as easily apply to the plethora of
other federal statutes and uniform warning labels to preempt
state tort claims brought under those regulations. 8 3 Accordingly, the court compared the Cigarette Act's purposes with
those of the United States Food and Drug Administration regulations regarding warnings on oral contraceptives, 84 and with the
purposes of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) concerning labeling requirements for hazardous household products. 18 5 Justice Clifford concluded that other judicial opinions
had found that mere compliance with a federal regulation did not
shield a manufacturer from an inadequate warning tort claim. 186
Recognizing that a finding of liability was a separate issue
which the court would not address, Justice Clifford concluded
that public policy dictated that New Jersey citizens be entitled to
bring an action against cigarette manufacturers without fear of
their claims being preempted by the Cigarette Act.' 8 7 Concluding that none of Dewey's state tort law claims were preempted by
181 Id. (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540). The Ferebee court determined that "a
state may choose to tip the scales more heavily in favor of the health of its citizens
than" is permitted by the federal legislation. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540.
182 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 92-93, 577 A.2d at 1250-51.
183 Id. at 92, 577 A.2d at 1250-51.
184 Id. at 92-93, 577 A.2d at 1251. The FDA enacted the regulations to increase
the information provided to consumers. 42 Fed. Reg. 4214. The information to be
included in the label covers precautions, effectiveness, warnings, and adverse reactions. 42 Fed. Reg. 4220. The actual text of the label is not specified in a formal
uniform rule, but rather must merely follow the prescribed guidelines. Id. See supra
note 81 and accompanying text.
185 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 93, 577 A.2d at 1251. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1970).
186 Id. The court specifically used MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
394 Mass. 131, 139-40, 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1985) (FDA commissioner specified
that states would have authority to determine inadequate warning liability) and
Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976) (inadequate warning claims
are not barred by compliance, because FHSA merely provides the minimum standard of warning) to support its theory. Id. See supra notes 77 and 86 and accompanying text. But see Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1989)
(state tort law can be preempted because it may conflict with congressional purposes in legislation). The FDA is distinguishable from the Cigarette Act, however,
because it specifically points out that although a label may be drafted by the FDA,
the manufacturer remains liable concerning its adequacy. 43 Fed. Reg. 4214.
187 Id. at 92, 577 A.2d at 1250.
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the Act, Justice Clifford emphasized that if it had been Congress's intention to shield cigarette manufacturers from liability,
Congress had the means to do so explicitly and with unmistakable clarity. 188

B.

The New Jersey Products Liability Law
The New Jersey Supreme Court next addressed the second
potential obstacle for Dewey's claims, namely, whether the New
Jersey Products Liability Law'8 9 (Products Liability Law) applied
retroactively to insulate cigarette manufacturers from liability for
inherent design defects.' 90 Justice Clifford noted that the Products Liability Law, which came into effect after Dewey's action
had been decided at the trial level, adopted the Restatement exception that shielded manufacturers and sellers from liability due
to harm caused by what the ordinary consumer recognized to be
the product's inherently dangerous propensities.' 9 ' The court
explained that under the law, defendants could still be liable for
defective manufacture, defective design or inadequate warning, if
the product was "not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose.""'
Moreover, the court determined that the Products Liability
Law was a "new rule" concerning strict liability for defective
products, rather than a codification of the existing common
law. 19 As such, Justice Clifford concluded that the Products Lia188 Id. at 93-94, 577 A.2d at 1251. Justice Clifford noted that the court's view is
in accord with Solicitor General Kenneth Starr who concluded in an unpublished
monograph, "[olur federal system, with its high regard for the several States' powers of governance, requires that judges not preempt state laws lightly." Id. (citations omitted). Solicitor General Starr recognized Justice Frankfurter's explanation
that when the Supreme Court analyzes preemption, " '[a]ny indulgence in construction should be in favor of the States, because Congress can speak with drastic
clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal authority.' " Id. (citations
omitted).
189 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§

2A:58C-1 to 7 (West 1987).

190 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251. The court recognized that the Prod-

uct Liability Law was created to establish rules, standards and procedures for litigating product liability actions and to codify those issues requiring clarification, as
well as establish new rules concerning liability and the burden of proof. Id. at 94-

95, 577 A.2d at 1251-52 (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1 (West 1987)).
191 Id. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251-52.
192 Id. at 94-95, 577 A.2d at 1252 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West

1987)).
193 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 95, 577 A.2d at 1252. A new rule relates to substantive
rights and changes the settled law. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Rosenthal, 14
NJ. 372, 381, 102 A.2d 587, 591 (1954). The importance of distinguishing be-

tween a new rule and a codification of the common law lies in the fact that a new
rule is not to be applied on or before the time the law was enacted. Dewey, 121 NJ.
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bility Law was to be prospectively applied. 9 4
Despite having foreclosed Brown's claim that the Product Liability Law was not a codification of existing law and hence
barred Dewey's claims, Justice Clifford proceeded to interpret
the "new rule" which the statute had established.' 95 The New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that prior rulings had established
that plaintiffs in strict liability actions could rely upon the risk
utility analysis in the event they could not prove their case using
the consumer expectations analysis.'9 6 The majority asserted
that the Product Liability Law "drastically changed" the strict liability analysis. 19 7 The "new rule" promulgated in the Products
Liability Law, Justice Clifford found, required that the consumer
expectations analysis always be applied in a strict liability action.' 98 Moreover, the majority proclaimed, the statute created a
new defense to design defect allegations by combining the consumer expectations test with the "obvious danger" element of
the risk utility analysis.' 99 Thus, the "obvious danger" element
was no longer a factor which the plaintiff had to establish in determining whether there was a duty to warn, the justice expounded, but instead, the element had been converted into a
defense which would absolve the defendant of liability.2"'
Brown argued that the Restatement commentary acknowledged an exception to strict liability for products such as "good
tobacco," which was not "unreasonably dangerous," because the
at 95, 577 A,2d at 1252. A law which is deemed a codification of existing law,
however, is to apply retrospectively. Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 95-96, 577 A.2d at 1252.
196 Id. at 96, 577 A.2d at 1252. See supra notes 119-132 and accompanying text.
See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983); Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'g Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled, Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
197 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 96, 577 A.2d at 1252. The court found that the statute
overturned those aspects of Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150,
460 A.2d 140 (1979) and O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298
(1983), which supported the use of a risk utility analysis when the consumer expectations test failed. Id. (citations omitted).
198 Id. at 96, 577 A.2d at 1252.
199 Id. at 96, 577 A.2d at 1252-53. The obvious danger element from N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1987) is discussed supra note 119.
200 Id. Justice Clifford noted that an exception to this rule existed for industrial,
as well as other work related equipment. Id. at 96-97. The Products Liability Law
provides in part: "this [defense] shall not apply to industrial machinery or other
equipment used in the workplace .....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West
1987).
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consumer had knowledge as to tobacco's characteristics. 2° '
Brown asserted that this commentary had been incorporated into
the Product Liability Law provision on defenses, and thus absolved Brown from liability. °2 Justice Clifford countered
Brown's argument by stating that only certain aspects of the commentary, namely the consumer expectations analysis, had been
incorporated into the statute.2 °3 The commentary upon which
Brown relied, the majority contended, had been excised from the
New Jersey courts' interpretations of the Restatement's strict liability provisions in earlier judicial decisions.20 4
Lastly, the majority dispensed with Brown's final argument
that public policy dictated that the court should immunize ciga20 5
rette manufacturers from liability as a matter of public policy.

Justice Clifford acknowledged Brown's argument that: (1) the
consumer had long been cognizant of the health risks of smoking
cigarettes; and (2) the consumer would be the cheapest cost
avoider.20 6 Justice Clifford, however, disagreed with Brown's
201 Dewey, at 97, 577 A.2d at 1253. Comment i of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A explains that "[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, comment i.
202 Dewey, at 97, 577 A.2d at 1253.
203 Id. The court contended that its earlier acknowledgement of the commentary
exceptions in Cepeda v. Cumberland, 76 N.J. 152, 170, 386 A.2d 816, 824-25
(1978), overruled on othergrounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J.
150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979) was merely dicta. Id. Cepeda acknowledged that comment
i's specification of "unreasonably dangerous" precluded products such as tobacco,
whiskey, sugar, and butter, products which are normally useful, from being deemed
harmful solely because of improper use, excessiveness or adulterated condition. Id.
at 170, 386 A.2d at 824.
204 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 97, 577 A.2d at 1253. Justice Clifford pointed out that the
Suter court rejected the Restatement's "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" terminology, and consequently comment i, because the provision imposed an
unreasonable burden on the plaintiff to prove the product's defective condition and
also that the product was unreasonably dangerous. Id. The Dewey court noted that
the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d
443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) interpreted the "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" phrase to suggest the theory "that recovery ... be permitted only if a
product is more dangerous than that contemplated by the average consumer,
[which would] permit the low esteem in which the public might hold a dangerous
product to diminish the manufacturer's responsibility for injuries caused by that
product." Id. at.97-98, 577 A.2d at 1253 (quoting Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 425, 573
P.2d 443, 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233 (1978)) (emphasis in original). Justice Clifford acknowledged that the consequences of this rule are illogical because the
lower the public esteem for a product, the lesser the manufacturer's chances for
liability. Id. at 98, 577 A.2d at 1353.
205 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 99, 577 A.2d at 1254 (citation omitted).
206 Id. The court referred to Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F.
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conclusion that this mandated cigarette manufacturer immunity
as a matter of public policy. 2

7

The court explained that the to-

bacco industry had successfully utilized the advertising medium
to extol the benefits of smoking cigarettes. 20

The success of this

advertising campaign, the justice posited, may have dispelled
public awareness of the health risks of cigarette smoking. 20 9 Justice Clifford concluded that there existed a material issue of fact
as to the actual consumer awareness of the dangers of smoking,
and thus the court could not decide, as a matter of public policy,
that cigarette manufacturers should be immune from liability for
injuries caused by their products.2 10
Supp. 1189, 1192 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988) (court
considered universal awareness of risks involved in smoking in determining that
plaintiffs had not made aprimafaciecase for a defective product). Id. Society historically has been concerned about the dangers of smoking. See Crist & Majoras, supra
note 2, at 554. Since the eighteenth century, writers and religious leaders "in both
Europe and America continued to expound upon the evils of tobacco and its
users." Id. at 554-55. In 1921, tobacco manufacture and sales were outlawed in
fifteen American states. Id.
207 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 99, 577 A.2d at 1254.
208 Id. at 99-100, 577 A.2d at 1254-55. Notably, legislative efforts were made to
limit the effect of advertising. The Cigarette Act was amended in 1970 to prohibit
the advertising of cigarettes and little cigars through any electronic communication.
15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
209 Id. This theory of advertising's neutralizing effect has been termed "watered
down warnings." McElvaine, Liability of Cigarette Manufacturersfor Smoking Induced
Illnesses and Deaths, 18 RurTGERs L. REV. 165, 182 n.120 (1986). Arising most frequently in the advertising of pharmaceuticals, the effect is to counteract the warning by giving false assurance to the consumer of the product's safety. See Salmon v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985);
Baldino v. Castagna, 308 Pa. Super. 506, 454 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Super. 1982), rev'd,
505 Pa. 239, 478 A.2d 807 (1984); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206
(1971).
Consequently, false and misleading advertising claims are prevalent against
cigarette manufacturers. Also many smokers underestimate the degree of risk involved in smoking. See Reducing the Health Consequences, supra note 2, at 23. In 1986,
15% of smokers in the United States did not believe that smoking increased the risk
of lung cancer, 29% did not believe the increased risk of heart disease, 27% did not
believe the increased risk of chronic bronchitis, and 15% did not believe the increased risk of emphysema. Id. at 22.
210 Id. at 100, 577 A.2d at 1255. The court recognized that this theory is in
agreement with the general policy in New Jersey of "liberally favoring jury resolution of defectiveness issues.., in products liability cases." Id. (quoting Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 736 (2d Cir. 1976)). See Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J.
454, 332 A.2d 599 (1975); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697
(1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
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Another Point of View

Judge Antell, temporarily assigned, concurred in part and
dissented in part.2 1 ' In his concurrence, the judge agreed with
the majority that the court was not bound by stare decisis to follow federal court interpretations of a federal statute.21 2 The dissenting judge also agreed with the majority's interpretation of
the Products Liability Law and posited that the law was not to be
retroactively applied. 21 3 Judge Antell, however, disagreed with
the majority's holding that Dewey's state tort claims for defective
design due to inadequate label warnings were not preempted by
the Cigarette Act.2 14
Judge Antell agreed with the majority that the court was not
bound by stare decisis to follow lower federal court interpretations
of federal laws. 2 15 The dissenting judge noted that judicial comity required that due respect be given to the lower federal court
decisions which were in agreement on the preemptive power of
the Cigarette Act.2 16

Judge Antell articulated the majority's interpretation of the
Cigarette Act's dual purposes as consisting of a principal goal of
informing the public of the health risks of cigarette smoking, and
of a secondary goal of protecting trade and commerce. 217 The
dissent restated the majority's finding that allowing state actions
would further the goal of warning the public and that the regulatory pressure exerted as a result was acceptably incidental and
not contrary to the Act's purposes.2 18 Judge Antell stressed,
however, the lack of evidence supporting the majority's conclu211 Id. at 100-01, 577 A.2d at 1255 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
212 Id. at 101, 577 A.2d at 1255 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
213 Id. (Antell, P.J.A.D. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
214 Id. at 100-01, 577 A.2d at 1255 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
215 Id. at 101, 577 A.2d at 1255 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
216 Id. Judge Antell agreed with the premise that judicial comity discouraged forum shopping by providing uniformity. Id. The dissent chided the majority, however, for arguing that due respect ought to be given to lower federal courts and
then summarily ignoring the "well-reasoned" lower federal court opinions. Id.
217 Id. at 101-02, 577 A.2d at 1255-56 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
218 Id. at 102, 577 A.2d at 1256 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Judge Antell noted that the majority's reasoning was that label uniformity to
protect trade and commerce was a subordinate goal which could not be allowed to
detrimentally affect the public information goal. Id.
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sion that the policy of protecting national commerce through
uniform labeling requirements was intended to be subservient to
the "principal" goal of informing the public. 2 9 Further, the majority's "principal" and "secondary" goal theory, the dissent
maintained, falsely concluded that state courts may modify or improve upon the express warning label stipulated by Congress, at
the expense of the national economy and commerce. 2 20 The
judge asserted that by creating this "principal" and "secondary"
purpose dichotomy, the majority misinterpreted Congress's
purpose.2 2'
Judge Antell reasoned that Congress's explicit purpose in
the Cigarette Act reflected a carefully crafted balance between
the two equal purposes and did not establish that the protection
of the consumer's health was a goal superior to that of protecting
national commerce.2 2 2 The entire congressional purpose for enacting the statute, the dissent explained, had been to prevent "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing regulations.1 223 Judge Antell
implied that allowing state tort law actions for inadequate warning claims would result in the cigarette manufacturer modifying
the federally mandated warning label rather than running the risk
of liability. 2 24 Modifying the label, the judge asserted, would create an "actual conflict" with the federal act and result in an imbalance between the congressional purposes.2 2 5
219 Id. at 103, 577 A.2d at 1256 (Anteli, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
220 Id.
221 Id.

222 Id. at 103-04, 577 A.2d at 1256-57 (Antell, P.J.A.D., conccuring in part, dissenting in part). The judge explained that the congressional policy stated in 15
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) as the following: "the purpose of this chapter, [is] to establish
a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and.., whereby
the public may be adequately informed and is given protection 'to the maximum
extent consistent with' warning the public." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)).
223 Id. at 105, 577 A.2d at 1257 (Antell, PJ.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (quoting Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Minn.
1989)).
224 Id. The judge argued that allowing such claims would create an even more
chaotic nonuniform system of labeling than would result from state regulation. Id.
225 Id. at 103-04, 577 A.2d at 1256-57 (Antell, PJ.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn.
1989) (state tort claims are preempted by the Cigarette Act because they regulate
the labeling and thus conflict with Congress's goals); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987) (found inconceivable that legislature intended "a
hard-fought, bitterly partisan battle in striking the compromise" to be abandoned
by a mere single jury decision); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J.
1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59
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Moreover, the judge refuted the majority's theory that the
Cigarette Act's preemption of "regulations" in 15 U.S.C. § 1334
pertained solely to formal state administrative or legislative regulation and was not intended to preclude judicial determinations
that stricter warning standards were required. 26 Implying that
there was a significant regulatory effect in judicial decisions, the
dissent argued that both state regulation and judicial determinations conflicted with Congress' purpose in enacting the Cigarette
Act.2 2 7 Judge Antell explained that by allowing civil tort actions,
manufacturers would, in fact, be exposed to a high degree of diversity and confusion in the cigarette labeling requirements. 22 8
Judge Antell next argued that those cases on which the majority relied did not support the majority's finding that state law
defective design actions based on inadequate warning were not
preempted by the Cigarette Act. 229 The dissent disagreed with

the majority's reliance on Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 230 because
the statute in Silkwood did not contain a preemption provision,
and because the Silkwood court found that Congress had clearly
intended to reserve state tort remedies for those injured in nuclear incidents.2 3 ' Further, the judge argued, Dewey had voluntarily exposed himself to the risks of smoking, whereas the
deceased in Silkwood had not voluntarily exposed herself to
2
injury.

23

U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991) (analysis of legislative history not necessary
because language of the Cigarette Act is clearly expressed).
226 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 104, 577 A.2d at 1257 (AntelI, P.J.A.D., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
227 Id. at 105, 577 A.2d at 1257. (Antell,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
228 Id. Additionally, the dissenting judge contended that tort lability actions are
more detrimental than state regulation to the manufacturer because the "[t]hey are
asserted after the fact, when compliance by the manufacturer is no longer possible
to avoid the consequences of a particular suit .... [and] compensatory or punitive
damages." Id. The dissent also noted that the preemption provision of the Cigarette Act, "prohibits any further requirement 'under state law;' it did not limit itself
to statutory law and is plainly intended" to include judicial decisions. Dewey, 121
N.J. at 104-05 n.2, 577 A.2d at 1257 n.2 (emphasis added) (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
229 Id. at 106, 577 A.2d at 1258 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
230 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
231 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 106, 577 A,2d at 1258 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
232 Id. Judge Antell also found Silkwood distinguishable because the defendant in
Silkwood had violated the statute and the Silkwood decision concerned an award of
punitive damages, which not only questions the defendant's state of mind, but also
has no effect on regulations. Id. at 106-07, 577 A.2d at 1258 (Antell, P.J.AD., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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The remaining cases relied upon by the majority were also
readily distinguished by Judge Antell. 2" The judge argued that
in MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,234 wherein the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed a tort remedy
against the manufacturer for placing inadequate warnings on oral
contraceptive packages, Congress, through the FDA Commissioner, had expressly not preempted state tort actions by specifically stating that state law was to establish the scope of tort
liability under the federal statute. 3 5 The judge distinguished
Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. ,236 explaining that because FIFRA
allowed states to impose additional restraints on use, uniformity
in labeling was clearly not a congressional purpose.2 3 7 Further,
Judge Antell reasoned that Congress, in enacting FIFRA, had not
specified the precise warning to be placed upon the product but
allowed different manufacturers to place different EPA-approved
labels on similar products. 23 8 This, the dissent stated, was in
striking contrast to the explicit warning label that Congress had
stipulated in the Cigarette Act be placed upon cigarette packages. 2 39 Lastly, Judge Antell distinguished Burch v. Amsterdam
Corp.,240 on the basis that whereas Congress, in the Cigarette Act,
had explicitly defined the preemptive power of the Act, Congress
in the Federal Hazardous Substances Act and its legislative his233 Id. at 107-08, 577 A.2d at 1258-59 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
234 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985). See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
235 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 107, 577 A.2d at 1258 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The FDA regulation providing guidelines for oral contraceptives provides in part:
[t]he fact that patient labeling may have been required and drafted by
FDA would not protect the manufacturer from an adverse jury determination on the issue of adequacy .... [Liability] depend[s] upon the
facts surrounding the manufacture, sale, and use of the drug product,
and on the nature of the injury . . . [as well as] the applicable [sItate
law, which can be adjusted by [sItate courts and [I]egislatures.
43 Fed. Reg. 4214, 4214 (1978).
236 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). See supra notes
178-81 and accompanying text.
237 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 107, 577 A.2d at 1258 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
238 Id. at 107-08, 577 A.2d at 1258-59 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The provision specifying the appropriate procedure for manufacturer registration of a pesticide allows the applicant to supply the proposed label. 7
U.S.C. § 136a (1988).
239 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 108, 577 A.2d at 1259 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
240 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976). See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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tory had not expressly preempted civil tort actions for inadequate
warning labels on hazardous products. 24 ' Further, the dissent
stated, the Burch reasoning did not apply because the Burch court
found no evidence of a congressional intent to impliedly preempt
24 2
state tort actions.
Judge Antell concluded his dissent by stressing that the
warning labels provided by the Cigarette Act were adequate to
promote the congressional purposes of informing the public of
the health risks of smoking cigarettes while minimizing the impact on national trade and commerce. 24 ' The dissenting judge
recognized that implicit within the statute was the assumption
that there were an infinite number of ways to express the warning, none of which could adequately encompass all of the health
risks to which smoking cigarettes gives rise. 4 4 Congressional
specification of the precise warning, the judge declared, indicated an intention to eliminate the potentially infinite liability for
cigarette manufacturers. 4 5 The dissent emphasized the confusion and disorder in the tobacco industry, with respect to warning label requirements, which would result as a consequence of
allowing judicial determinations of state tort claims for smokingrelated injuries.2 4 6 In closing, Judge Antell condemned the majority for "licensing a form of legal sanction forbidden by Congress" and creating the "very chaos which the [Cigarette] Act
24 7
attempts to resolve.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Dewey, the New Jersey Supreme Court boldly diverged
from federal court precedent and transformed New Jersey's approach to smoking-related injury claims. 248 The court properly
determined that it was not bound by stare decisis and, therefore,
241 Dewey, 121 NJ. at 107-08, 577 A.2d at 1258-59 (Antell, PJ.A.D., concurring in

part, dissenting in part).
242 Id. at 108, 577 A.2d at 1259 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (citation omitted).
243 Id.
244 Id.

245 Id.
246 Id. at 108-09, 577 A.2d at 1259 (Antell, P.J.A.D., concurring in part, dissent-

ing in part). The judge explained that the Cigarette Act's purpose is to "protect[]
the public with minimal consequences to the cigarette industry." Id. at 108, 577
A.2d at 1259 (Anteil, PJ.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
247 Id. at 108-09, 577 A.2d at 1259 (Antell, PJ.A.D., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
248 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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gave only the "due respect" required by judicial comity to the
Third Circuit's Cipollone decision.249
Consequently, Justice Clifford agreed with the Cipollone court
that state law claims were not preempted by the Cigarette Act.
The Dewey majority also agreed with the Third Circuit that Congress did not intend to control exclusively the entire field. The
New Jersey court diverged, however, in its "actual conflict" analysis by using a novel approach to determine that common law
actions do not impede the legislative goals of the Cigarette Act.
By "creating" statutory language, the court gave consumer
health priority over commerce. This use of outcome-oriented
reasoning is unsupported by the statute or its legislative history.
Moreover, the court simplified Brown's options when confronted with state tort claims. 250 Faced with the dilemma of modifying its package warning or ignoring unfavorable jury verdicts,
Brown, in effect, has a "choice akin to the free choice of coming
up for air after being underwater." Therefore, the cigarette industry must accommodate every jurisdiction's interpretation of
an "adequate warning."
Failure to warn and design defect claims should be preempted by the Cigarette Act. As the dissent argues, the regulatory effect of allowing state tort claims is not incidental and
clearly conflicts with congressional intent to protect commerce
from the potential chaos of non-uniform labeling requirements. 25 1 The future of the cigarette industry should rest with
the legislature, not a creative court.
The Dewey court, however, correctly applied the new strict
liability rule for defective products prospectively.252 In dicta, the
court weakly argued that the New Jersey legislature, when adopting comment i of the Restatement section 402A into the Products
Liability Law, did not adopt all of the examples listed in the comment. Thus, there exists a judicially-created anomaly that the
"good tobacco" exception in comment i is not included in the
NewJersey Product Liability Law. The SenateJudiciary Committee Statement (Statement) concerning that same law, however,
recognized "that there are many common products, such as food
and other consumer products, whose use necessarily involves
See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 80, 577 A.2d at 1244.
See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
251 See Dewey, 121 NJ. at 105, 577 A.2d at 1257 (Antell, PJ.A.D., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
252 Id. at 95, 577 A.2d at 1252.
249
250
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some risk of harm. ' 2 53 Although the Statement includes butter
as its only example, the legislature clearly did not intend to ex25 4
clude all other examples listed in the Restatement comment.
Rather, the Statement specifies that the rule applies to "familiar
' 2 55
consumer products of the kind identified in comment i.
Justice Clifford's contention that the industry's advertising
creates a fact issue whether consumers are truly aware of the inherent risks of smoking is also open to criticism. With an exception for those who cannot fully appreciate the risk involved,2 5 6
there is general acceptance that cigarette smoking is unhealthy
and increases the risk of disease. 2 57 Despite the obvious acceptance of the danger to themselves, the New Jersey Supreme Court
will allow smokers to be compensated for their self-inflicted injuries contrary to congressional intentions.
Jean L. Dusinski
253 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1 (Senate Judiciary Committee Statement)(West
1987).
254 Id. The committee singularly excepted products and machinery used in the
workplace. Id.
255 Id.
256 For example, children and the mentally impaired.
257 See Reducing the Health Consequences, supra note 2 (discussing the long-standing
fear of the dangers of cigarette smoking).

